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ABSTRACT 
 This study is necessitated by the debate about competition in the banking sector of South 
Africa based on the dominance of the big four banks and is premised on establishing the 
effect of competition on financial stability. It is propelled by the reactionary recalibration 
of fiscal and monetary policies to reinstate system stability owing to post-crises system 
instabilities which manifested over 1990-2015 in addition to the aggregation of 
competition indices at country and bank level as well as the misnomer that likens 
concentration to competition. The research complements existing literature by and 
inferring the effect of competition on stability, over the duration 1990-2015 and debunking 
the concentration-competition misnomer. It also maps the competitive terrain of the South 
African banking market by utilising a two- pronged estimation approach. Initially 
competition is estimated using a log-transformation method to calculate the Lerner, 
Adjusted Lerner indices and H-statistic. Followed by, calculation of the Z-Score. The study 
then uses the results from the three indices to exhaustively affirm monopolistic 
competition as the predominant competitive environment in South Africa. Using the Z-
score and Lerner indices with OLS estimation methods incorporating robust standard 
errors, the study posits the relationship between competition and stability and suggests 
that South Africa is inclined towards competition-fragility. These finding are aligned with 
preceding studies of a similar nature and have implications for policy formulation in 
addition to adding value to banking theories on banking crises and competition. 
The outcomes have connotations for policy formulation, suggesting that  while South 
African Banks are monopolistically competitive, there is room to harness the spill overs 
from macro-economic indicators of financial health and stability for instance through 
improved access to finance and bank alliances that will enhance the prospects of Small and 
Medium Enterprises.  In addition, the South African Government through its agency of 
regulation and supervision is better placed to maintain financial stability armed with the 
mechanism for setting reforms in a monopolistic competition environment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. CONTEXT & BACKGROUND  
A competitive banking sector is the foundation of a sound economy as competitive banking 
implies efficient allocation in the provision of banking products and services to the savers 
and borrowers. Hence, a lack of competition among banks is detrimental to the overall 
performance of the economy in light of their role in the transmission of monetary policy 
via the leeway banks have on the loans and deposits market. 
Financial system stability policy rose to prominence following the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) of 2008 because financial authorities had concentrated on monetary policy issues 
while liberalising the financial sector and this resulted in more banks and non-bank 
institutions offering innovative products. The financial stability policy was necessitated by 
the contagion effect because of the connectivity and reliance of the globalised financial 
systems among economies the world over as they competed in the lending space.  
Africa appeared to be insulated from the severe impact of the GFC because of its 
predominantly underdeveloped markets and low-key integration with global markets 
(Kasekende, Ndikumana &Rajhi, 2009). Furthermore, for South Africa, Maredza and Ikhide 
(2013) reported that the cushioning to the GFC was attributed to the presence of 
comprehensive regulation and firm macroeconomic policies.  South Africa’s status as an 
emerging economy and its global interlinkages were not to be spared (Lin, Edvinsson, 
Chen and Beding, 2012). The effects of the GFC manifested through declining and negative 
GDP figures, rising inflation and unemployment, a widening current account budget deficit 
as well as declining mining and manufacturing indices for the first half of 2009 
(Padayachee, (2012); Kasekende, Ndikumana, Rajhi, (2009) & Lin, Edvinsson, Chen, & 
Beding, (2013)). As a result of the formation of the Financial Stability Review in 2000, the 
South African Reserve Bank, “SARB” (2004), adopted financial stability reforms (SARB, 
2011), whose necessity was amplified in 2014 by the failure then rescue of African Bank. 
The bank’s failure exposed the extent banks competed by taking on riskier unsecured 
lenders in the of pursuit of lucrative bottom-lines and trading in hybrid financial products, 
a view attested to by Tabak, Fazio & Cajueiro (2012) in their study of the relationship 
between bank risk taking and competition. The subsequent bank rescue package was 
implemented via a precedential regulatory tool, a “bail-in” (IMF, 2014; Reuters, 2014). This 
meant that taxpayers would no longer shoulder the burden of collapsed institutions but 
rather that senior debt instruments (the bank’s creditors) would incur a 10% haircut on 
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their liabilities while the largest 5 banks (whose exposure was minimal) would underwrite 
the recapitalisation of the good loan book of African Bank and shareholders would forfeit 
their shares (PWC, 2015). Indirectly, this recapitalisation led to investors taking a 
proportional cut in their investments held with the big five banks. The pervasiveness of 
competition in the financial services  sector  and its’ all-encompassing effect on consumer 
welfare, productivity, economic growth and financial stability cannot be ignored.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
There is a trade-off between financial system stability and competition among banks. The 
latter suggests benefits to consumers from efficiency in financial markets resource 
allocation and pricing while the former portends innovative bank products and reckless 
risk-taking as institutions seek to boost their bottom line (OECD, 1998). Competition 
among banks implies rivalry amongst banks in their service and product provisions, which 
ranges from retail, commercial and offshore to exotics like derivatives with the aim to 
garner the market share that will lead to the most lucrative bottom line and this may 
involve taking more risks.  
Researchers have pursued corroboration pertaining to the dynamic relationship between 
competition and bank soundness by checking whether the financial stability of banks 
increases or decreases when competition is higher. This research focusses on the elements 
of financial stability that subsumes the buoyancy of a financial system to non-idiosyncratic 
turmoil while embracing proficient financial intermediation and the alleviation of the 
financial repercussions of economic disturbances in order to restore confidence in the 
system, (Financial Stability Review, 2015).  
Studies on financial system stability and competition among banks  have been conducted in 
financial systems globally covering, the United States of America, Europe, Mexico, Russia, 
Australia, Asia and Africa among others. Schaeck and Cihak (2014) attribute regulatory 
failures or weak market discipline to the instability of financial systems and hence vie for 
competition amongst banks.  
There is overall concurrence on the inconclusive nature of the interaction between 
financial system stability and bank competition.  
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1.2. MOTIVATION 
This research was premised on a number of motivating factors. 
Firstly, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-2009 caused by sub-prime lending with 
repercussions such as bank closures and loss of savings for investors. These were 
experienced globally but were less damaging to the South African economy owing to 
stringent regulation and supervision by the central bank authorities (SARB, 2012 ). 
Secondly, the African Bank’s collapse and the subsequent turmoil in the local bank sector 
leading to losses for investors, institutions and individuals alike owing to the new bail-in 
rescue approach that was adopted.  
Thirdly between 2001-2002 political stirrups that caused shocks to the economy and 
impacted banks  
Fourthly, to date, existing literature on competition among banks in South Africa has not 
delved into establishing the relationship nor has it covered the period 1990-2015.  
 
1.3. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
This research seeks to establish if competition amongst banks may initiate financial 
instability or at the slightest be a foundation of risk for financial stability for South African 
banks in light of the following events and their subsequent effects. 
1.3.1. EXPANDED PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The inconclusive nature of the relationship between bank competition and financial system 
stability warrants an investigation because;  
 Achieving and maintaining financial stability is a goal of public policy (Crockett, 
1997), which if ignored has repercussions of negative large-scale effects on 
consumer welfare, productivity, economic growth and financial stability as a result 
of bank’s activities Padayachee (2012). Policy makers seek to strike a balance 
between improving the financial system stability while fostering a fair competitive 
platform for all financial institutions (Anginer, Demirguc-Kunt & Zhu, 2014). 
 The new precedents, (bail-in) to rescuing failing banks that the SARB implemented 
following African Bank’s collapse resulted in absorption of  the losses by not only 
institutional but private individual investors as well(IMF,  2014; Reuters, 2014).  
 South Africa’s concentrated banks with a concentration ratio exceeding 90% 
(McGregor BFA, 2015) accruing to the big four banks, ABSA, Standard Bank, 
Nedbank and First National Bank (Verhoef, 2009) begs the question whether the 
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tendency is for a landscape of collusion (cartel) rather than competition and the 
resulting impact on financial system stability. By the end of 2015 bank market 
shares were dominated by the big four banks as illustrated in figure1.  
 Globalisation and the birth of hybrid financial instrument has led the debate about 
bank competition and financial stability as testament to the  contagion felt by the 
Global Financial Crisis as highlighted  by  Liu, Molyneux, and Wilson (2013), 
Horvath, Sendler and Weill (2016).  Wherein numerous banks suffered losses and 
were compelled to source capital privately from their governments. 
 Studies on financial stability have largely dwelt on establishing the level of 
efficiency in the banking system in South Africa Ncube (2009) and Mlambo & Ncube 
(2011) and bank competition globally (Berger, Klapper & Turk-Ariss 2009) or 
analysing market structures (Simatele, 2015). With respect to competition among 
South African banks, precedent studies have dwelt on; testing for the level of 
competition (Simbanegavi et al., 2014), and aggregating competition in  a handful of 
African banks (Hope, Gwatidzo and Ntuli, 2013). In addition, Kapingura, Maredza 
and Mhishi (2009) established that a conducive competitive environment for 
increasing bank productivity was and continued to be realised owing to the large 
size of participants’ capital base irrespective of monetary policies in place.     
No research has been done in South Africa into the effect of competition among the big 
four banks and their impact on financial stability covering the period 1990-2015 during 
which, there was a global meltdown owing to the subprime lending crisis as well as 
bank amalgamations and bank rescue packages introduced .  
1.4. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The study seeks to; 
• analyse the two contrasting hypotheses connecting bank competition to stability i.e. 
Competition-fragility and Competition-stability and place South Africa’s 
predisposition. 
• establish if the South African economy’s bank system is concentrated and the 
implications that emanate thereof  by using market share , concentration data and 
literature review. 
• ascertain within the banking industry in South Africa,  
o the level and type of competition among banks  
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o the empirical relationship concerning financial stability, in tandem with  
competition among banks    
• expound on the implications of the stability-competition relationship of banks in 
South Africa . 
Fulfilment of the above objectives will pave way to make recommendations for 
government policy on banking competition through its agents of regulation and 
supervision of the financial system in South Africa  
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 What is South Africa’s predisposition in light of the two contrasting hypotheses of 
competition fragility and competition stability? 
 Regarding the concentration of the South African banking system; 
a. At what level is it concentrated?  
b. Does this level complement or counteract competitiveness? 
c. What is the extent of competition among South African banks from comparison of 
empirical measures, data and literature? 
 What type of relationship exists for South African Banks between financial stability and 
competition?  
a. Is it positive or negative? 
b. What is the relationship dependent on?  
c. Does competition among the banks initiate instability or at the slightest, act as an 
impetus of risk for financial stability for South African Banks? 
 
1.6. THEORY OF BANK COMPETITION 
1.7. Extant Literature centred on the competition amongst banks juxtapose two schools of 
thought; the competition-stability view against that of competition-fragility 
(concentration- stability). While there is no common ground on the superiority of each 
construct, each school is premised on the trade-off between financial system stability and 
competition among banks. These being  efficiency in financial markets resource allocation 
as well as pricing being the advantage of the latter to the consumer while the former has 
connotations of innovative bank products as well as reckless risk-taking as institutions 
seek to boost their bottom line Beck (2008). 
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1.7.1. BANK CONCENTRATION SOUTH AFRICA 
According to the OECD (2011), while oligopolistic structures are common in bank systems 
in many countries inclusive of emerging markets, that structure does not eliminate their 
competitive tendencies. Hence, while the South African system was and currently still is 
dominated by the big four banks, which take up more than 90% of market share, they 
remain competitive. 
1.8. SIGNIFICANCE  OF THE RESEARCH  
In light of the context of this research, this study will be beneficial for these reasons: 
It will contribute to the existing scant literature by;  
• covering the period 1990-2015 during which a number of crises occurred and 
impacted the stability of banks.   
• empirically investigating the effect of competition among the big four banks and 
their impact on financial stability  
• corroborating the findings on the South African banks’ predisposition when it 
comes to the competitive landscape. 
• debunking the concentration – competition misnomer. 
• suggesting policy formulations for the agents of regulation and supervision that 
uphold the monetary policy transmission mechanism in light of the identified 
competitive environment. 
The study will be beneficial to academia and industry for the purposes of research by 
students and policymaking by agents of regulation and supervision and decision making by 
bank stakeholders. 
1.9. CHRONOLOGY OF CHAPTERS 
The write up of this study is organised as follows; 
Chapter 2:  is the Literature Review, which pays homage to relevant precedent studies.  
Chapter 3:  is the Methodology, which outlines the methods, and presents the  
  diagnostics used at granular level. 
Chapter 4:  is the Results section, which presents and discusses the results while  
  aligning the outcomes to previous studies 
Chapter 5:   summarises the outcomes and highlights the limitations of the study  as well 
  as suggesting aligned studies for further research. 
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The list of references is a guide to the sources cited in the study  
The Appendices contains the supporting document that displays tables and graphs 
described in chapters 3 and 4   
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Researchers have sought to verify the dynamic relationship between competition and bank 
soundness by checking whether the financial stability of banks increases or decreases 
when competition is higher. Two schools of thought are juxtaposed followed by a 
discussion of the bank competition- stability nexus in the world mainly from the developed 
markets and then moving onto Africa and finally South Africa. The shortcomings of the 
studies are articulated and the opportunity for a study from a new perspective is delved 
into. The instruments and models for measuring bank stability as well as bank competition 
are deliberated as well. 
2.2 DISCOURSE IN THEORY 
In analysing competition in banks and its’ perceived effects, two theories have been 
proposed with no conclusive common ground realised to date.  
There is extant literature supporting the competition fragility view (concentration-stability 
coined by Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012) which proposes that in collusive markets, 
banks enjoy higher premiums and consequently acquire a cushion from crises thus 
negating any risk taking incentives. In their unique samples of studies,  Keeley (1990), 
Allen and Gale (2000, 2004), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine(2006, 2008), Beck (2008), 
Beck, De Jonghe and Schepens (2013), Berger, Klapper and Turk-Ariss (2009), Angelov and 
Asadov (2010), , Soedarmono, Machrouh and  Tarazi (2013), Fungáčová, Pessarossi and 
Weill (2013), Diallo (2015), Horvath, Seidler, and Weill (2016) among others  propose that 
competition decreases market power, reduces profit margins and encourages banks to 
undertake risky product offerings leading to financial system instability. 
In contrast proponents of the competition stability view abound and include Claessens and 
Laeven (2004), Boyd and De Nicoló (2005), Ariss (2009), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), 
Schaeck and Cihaak (2014). Martinez –Miera and Repullo (2009), Angelov and Assado 
(2010), Yaldız and Bazzana (2010), Van Leuvensteijn,  Sørensen,  Van Rixteland Sørensen 
(2013), Liu, Molyneux and Wilson(2013), Fiordelisi, and Mare (2014), Anginer, Demirguc-
Kunt and Zhu (2014) and currently Akins, Li, Ng, Rusticus, (2016) among others. They 
argue that bank competition is not detrimental to the financial system because it increases 
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efficiency and enhances the ability of the financial system to recuperate from adverse 
shocks.   
Then there are those who find little interaction between banks’ competition and financial 
system stability, Zigraiova and Havranek (2015), İskenderoğlu and Tomak (2013) and Jeon 
and Lim (2013). 
Jeon et al. (2013) explain the divergent connection between banking competition and 
financial stability as hinging on the characteristics of different banks and ascertaining 
compromise between the interest effect and risk sifting effect being attributable to the 
non-linear relationship between the two. Likewise in line with Boyd and DeNicolo (2005) 
they support the competition-stability construct. 
2.3 COMPETITION AND STABILITY INVESTIGATIONS 
2.3.1 GLOBAL  
Numerous studies have delved into the relationship between financial stability and 
financial competition in both the developed financial systems in Europe, the United States 
of America, Australia as well as emerging financial markets of Mexico, Russia, Korea, Japan, 
Turkey, and other Asian countries. 
In the United States of America Akins and Rusticus (2016) use pre and post financial crisis 
evidence to substantiate the competition-fragility view between competition and risk 
taking and they demonstrate that increased competition among banks is linked to 
heightened levels of financial instability. Fernandez and Garcia (2015) found that in the 
Mexican-banking sector the increment in bank portfolio risks is compensated by the 
benefits on the overall financial system stability. Jeon et al.’s (2013) study of Korean 
commercial banks and mutual savings institutions evidenced that the non- linear 
relationship between competition and stability was dependant on bank characteristics 
because of the compromise in the risk shifting and interest effect affirming the beneficial 
effect of increased competition on financial system stability. While recent theory and 
evidence point toward the positive effect of competition on stability Boyd and De 
Nicolo(2005), Schaek and Cihak (2014), Allen, Carletti, and Marquez(2011) as well as  
Zigraiova and Havranek (2015) contest this view. Instead, they attribute the divergence in 
views, evident from moderate publication bias in studies, on the effect of bank competition 
on financial stability to the data methodology and control variables utilised.  
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Similarly, Mishkin (1999), stresses that, in concentrated systems, regulators are prone to 
implement too-big-to-fail policies that encourage risk-taking behaviour by banks. 
The discourse regarding the literature on banking and competition is emphasised by 
Havranek, and Zigraiova (2015). Their research reveals the inconclusive proof for neither 
financial stability nor competition stability constructs. Furthermore, different countries 
experience varying degrees of systemic crises and banks in concentrated systems are 
found to possess higher capital ratios, which compensate the probability of increasingly 
risky decisions by the bank.       
2.3.2 AFRICA  
On the African platform Hope, Gwatidzo and Ntuli (2013) implement the Generalised 
Method of Moments ‘GMM’ estimation technique to establish the relationship implicit 
between bank competition and financial sector stability in 10 African banks including 
South Africa.  The Lerner index and Herfindahl Hirschman index proxy competition while 
stability via the Z-score. They find a case for the competition-fragility view. They postulate 
that some macro-economic control variables enhance financial sector stability and 
furthermore call for continent-wide bank alliances. They propose that these measures may 
enhance the success rate of Small and Medium Enterprises by facilitating access to 
financial products and services.   
2.3.3 SOUTH AFRICA  
In South Africa, the literature on the relationship between bank competition and financial 
stability is scant, though a few studies concentrate on bank competition and efficiency, 
bank market structures as well as testing for competition while others discuss the 
concentration-competition discourse. 
Ncube (2009) measured the cost to efficiency ratios of 4 large and small banks individually 
and discovered insignificant incremental changes in efficiency with weakly positive 
correlations and none of the banks had the upper-hand for bank costs containment nor 
margin efficiencies. 
Mlambo and Ncube (2011) whose studies on financial stability largely dwelt on 
establishing the level of efficiency in the banking system using the P-R methodology to 
measure competition revealed that between 1999 – 2008 average bank efficiency 
portrayed a positive trajectory amidst a deteriorating number of efficient banks thus 
characterising the industry with monopolistic competition tendencies. This was during a 
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period when five banks dominated the sector by commanding more than 90% in overall 
banking assets.   
 
In analysing the South African bank market structures, their inherent competition and 
performance, Simatele (2015) implements the P-R model as well, and concurs on the view 
of a monopolistically competitive banking environment and reports that the high 
concentration ratio attests to this view in addition to which competition in the industry is 
also increasing. 
Simbanegavi et al. (2014) lay the foundation of their studies on the extent of commissions 
of enquiry that have been set up to in reaction to the concentration of banks in South 
Africa. They utilise the ‘P-R’ and Bresnahan methodology as assessment for the presence 
and level of competition in South Africa and find that while the market exhibits 
monopolistic competition, policies are needed direly to enhance the sector and increase 
efficiency. 
2.4 ESTIMATION METHODS  
With the diversity in competition studies, the calculation thereof also features prominently. 
Tabak, Fazio and Cajueiro (2012) attribute the use of different methods of estimation of 
competition to the indirect observability of competition levels essentially because the 
individual prices of banking products vary as well as the way rival banks respond to each 
other’s actions.  
Numerous studies have used different models to test the two hypotheses of concentration-
stability versus competition fragility in order to establish if the level of competition among 
banks has an impact on financial stability, efficiency and even systemic risk. Among these 
models are the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index “HHI” for market-level measures of 
competition in Boyd et al.’s (2010) study. The Boone Indicator (2008) which states that 
competition increases the performance of competent firms thus conveying the magnitude 
of competition on the competence of efficient banks. Schaeck and Cihak (2014), Nicol´o et 
al. (2004) and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine (2006) use the Concentration Ratio as a 
market based quantification of competition.  Tobin’s Q comes in as an indirect 
quantification of competition and is used by Keeley (1990). The Panzar–Rosse (1987) H-
statistic is utilised by Claessens and Laeven (2004), Turk-Ariss (2009), Mlambo and Ncube 
(2011), Simabanegavi and Greenberg 2009 and Hope et al.  (2013). The P-R method is 
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popular for its basis as a non-structural approach where the level of competition is 
determined by the elasticities of the price variables in the model.  
The Lerner index by Abba Lerner in 1934 and implemented by Fiordelisi and Havranek 
(2015), Diallo (2015) as well as Fungáčová, et al.(2013). The index estimates the bank’s 
market supremacy on a scale between 0 and 1 to reveal the bank’s leeway to charge prices 
exceeding the marginal cost. The two extremes, 0 and 1 denote perfect competition and 
pure monopoly respectively.  
2.5 CONCENTRATION AND COMPETITION  
The concentration level of banks in South Africa aggregates at 96.5% over the period 1996-
2014 as measured by asset concentration ratios extracted from the Federal Reserve 
Economic Data for South Africa FRED(2016). In figure 1 the trend of concentration begins 
at 89,5% in 1996 and drops to a low of 87% owing to liberalisation of the sector and the 
entrance of a number of new players especially foreign banks (Claessens & Van Horen, 
2011). 
Figure 1: Concentration levels of the top banks in South Africa 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data                        
 
From thereon over the next couple of years, a number of financial institution mergers 
caused concentration to peak in 1998 by 98.2%  however, the ensuing 2001-2002 Asian 
crisis impacted the concentration  ratio with a downward trend owing to the continued 
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growth of market  with more players’ asset bases taking a knock from dwindling foreign 
holdings. The ratio levelled out at 92.5% in 2003 going on to attain 100%, an all-time high, 
in 2004. Even during the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis “GFC” the ratio hovered around 
98.5% with only a 0.5% decline. The minimal impact is attributed to the implementation of 
stringent measure by the regulation and supervision authorities at the South African 
Reserve Bank “SARB” through the Financial Stability Reforms promulgated in 2004. As the 
market recovered from the GFC and the state relinquished shareholding in banks, Allen 
and Senbet (2011), the concentration ratio maintained levels above 99% since 2009, refer 
to figure 1 (p.19). 
The misconstrued belief  in the banking spheres that bank asset concentration is an 
indicator of the level of competition is evidenced in previous studies by Okeahalam 
(2001)as well as  Falkena, Davel, Llewellyn, Luus, Masilela and Shaw (2004) and Mckenzie 
(2013) who have concluded that the South African banking sector is highly concentrated 
and thus leaving no room for competition. However, Simbanegavi, Greenberg and Gwatidzo 
(2012) while concurring on the high levels of concentration in the South African financial 
system, (as shown in Figure 1 p.19) argue that the level of competition in any particular 
banking sector occurs via an inverse relationship therefore concentration does not 
necessarily negate competition. In addition, Simbanegavi, Greenberg and Gwatidzo (2015) 
utilising the Panzar- Rosse “P-R”and Bresnahan methodology went on to identify 
monopolistic competition as the type of competition in the South African banking sector.  
In concurrence with Mckenzie (2013) they furthermore attribute these high concentration 
levels to historical and structural factors and not competition per se. 
2.6 MOTIVE FOR STUDY  
The aforementioned literature exhibits deficiencies such as the period covered, the 
aggregation of competition indices at country and bank level as well as the misnomer that 
likens concentration to competition. The nature of the empirical relationship between bank 
competition and financial system stability in South Africa warrants an investigation 
because the precedent studies have not extended over a 25 year gap, (1990-2015), which 
experienced numerous globally and locally induced crises.   
 
It is propelled by the reactionary recalibration of fiscal and monetary policies to reinstate 
system stability owing to post-crises system instabilities which manifested over 1990-
2015. 
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Existing literature has aggregated the banking sector at regional as well as country level 
without assessing at granular level the competition among the big four banks.  
In light of these shortcomings, a gap reveals itself in the precedent studies. 
 
2.7 SUMMARY  
There is consensus on the discourse about bank competition and financial stability covered 
in the competition-fragility and concentration-stability theories. Investigations have been 
conducted at global, regional and country level with numerous econometric estimation 
methods at play. The concentration competition misnomer is debunked to show that the 
presence of a concentrated bank system does not absolve the participants or sector from 
behaving competitively. The deficiencies of the prevailing literature are inherent in the 
duration as well as aggregation of data.   
Chapter 2 has largely explored existing studies in a literature review that covers the 
discourse in theories and has truncated previous studies from global and regional level to 
country level. Estimation methods were discussed and additionally the misnomer of 
concentration as an indicator of competition was dispelled leading to the identification of 
the gap for this study.  The next section deals with the actual data collection, estimation 
and diagnostic testing of variables with validations for the chosen instruments.  
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
The study measures bank stability as a function of bank competition. Detailed description 
of all variables in the empirical formulation utilised are presented in Table 3.1.  
The ensuing regression model below is used to observe the influence of bank competition 
on financial stability.  
 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝑡 𝑋𝑘𝑡+ 𝑒𝑡
𝑁
𝑘=1    [1] 
𝛼    is a constant  
𝑡    are the index quarters 
Competition  is quantified through the Lerner index, and adjusted Lerner  
   as well as Panzar-Rosse in 3 separate models 
𝑋    is the composition of 𝑁 control variables, including the   
   explicit bank and market-associated variables. 
 
3.1.1. STABILITY 
The central exogenous variable is bank stability, which is conventionally proxied using the 
Z-Score index developed by Roy (1952). The bigger the value of the Z-index, infers lesser 
possibilities of failure. 
3.1.1.1. Z-SCORE INDEX 
Bank stability is proxied by employing the Z-score, which has been widely used in banking 
research (e.g. Berger et al., 2009; Uhde et al., 2009; Tabak et al., 2012; Jeon et al., 2013; 
Schaeck and Cihak, 2014). The abundance of empirical studies utilising this measure 
attests to its acceptability owing to its ability to measure a bank’s soundness and safety. It 
captures a bank’s extent from insolvency hence when there is insufficient equity for 
recoupment of losses then a bank is deemed insolvent. The Z-score is an inverse measure 
of the extent of likelihood to default a particular bank is, therefore a larger Z-score 
represents reduced bankruptcy risk. The Z-score is defined by Jeon et al. (2013) as the 
aggregate of the ROAs and Capital Ratios in proportion to the standard deviation of the 
ROAs and is depicted as follows;  
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  𝑍𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑡 =
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡+𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑡
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡)
        [2] 
where ; 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡   is the Return On Assets for banks in current period t.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑡   is the capital-asset (equity/ assets) ratio for banks  in current period t.  
𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡)  is computed as the standard deviation of return on assets for the banks in 
  current period t. 
Owing to its’ skewness a log-transformation of the Z-score was utilised thus normalising it 
to be distributed about the mean 0 as well as to be applicable in the main stability 
equation. 
The index represents an inverse estimate of the odds of default a particular bank faces; 
therefore, a larger Z-score represents reduced bankruptcy risk. 
3.1.2. COMPETITION 
An assortment of 3 competition indices will be utilised as a comparison platform for the 
extent and type of competition among banks in South Africa. These are, the Lerner Index, 
the Adjusted Lerner index and the Panzar-Rosse H- Statistic. 
3.1.2.1. LEARNER INDEX OF MONOPOLY POWER 
Implementing  the Lerner Index  as a competition proxy will be accomplished following 
Ariss (2009), Anzoategui et al. (2010),   Berger et al. (2009), Fungáčová et al.(2010), 
Jimenez et al. (2010) ), Liu et al. (2013) Fiordelisi and Mare (2014), Jeon et al, (2013) and 
Zigraiova and Havranek (2015) among others. The index assesses the bank’s market reign 
on a scale stretching between 0 and 1 to reveal the bank’s extent of legroom to charge 
prices exceeding the marginal cost. Perfect Competition is denoted by 0, while superior 
market power is reflected in greater values beyond 0 with 1 signifying a purely 
Monopolistic banking sector.   
This index has a couple of variants; 
The index assesses the bank’s market control as being the degree to which banks can 
charge a price exceeding the marginal cost;  
     learnerit =
Pit−mcit
Pit
        [3] 
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Where  
𝑃𝑡𝑖𝑠 𝑎 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑦 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝑜𝑓𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑  
 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡     
𝑚𝑐𝑡 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘
′𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠′𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡  
3.1.2.2. ADJUSTED LEARNER INDEX 
This index is an efficiency adjusted measure as used by Diallo (2015) from Kotter et al. 
(2012) and modified because the true extent of market power is not captured accurately 
by estimated Price – marginal relationship,  ( 𝑃𝑖;  𝑚𝑐𝑖). 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑡 =
 𝜋𝑡+𝑇𝐶𝑡+𝑞𝑡𝑚𝑐𝑡
 𝜋𝑡+𝑇𝐶𝑡
                                                                               [4]
  
Where;  
 𝜋 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠  𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡  
𝑇𝐶 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝑀𝐶 𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑤𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑠 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
𝑞 𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡 
Both Lerner indices will take on estimates ranging from 0 to 1, (although the Adjusted 
Lerner Index will be calculated as a percentage and then converted to decimal), It is 
construed that an estimate falling halfway of the 0; 1 range implies monopolistic 
competition.  
Conventionally following Beck, et al. (2013) marginal costing was estimated via a threefold 
output trans log cost function with a single output that excludes the time trend as follows; 
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑛𝑄 +
𝛼2
2
𝑙𝑛𝑄2 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
3
𝑗=1 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗 +
1
2
∑ ∑ 𝛿𝑗,𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑘 +
3
𝑘=1
3
𝑗=1
1
2
∑ 𝛾𝑗
3
𝑘=1 𝑙𝑛𝑄 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑗 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                      [5]  
Where;  
𝑇𝐶𝑡   represents  the total costs (i.e. total personnel expenses, other   
  administrative expenses and operating expenses), and  
Q   is the total assets as a proxy for the banks’ single output  
P1, P2, and P3 represent the values of the inputs used in the production system:  
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P1   is the rate of labour (i.e. personnel expenses divided by total assets);  
P2   is the value of physical capital (i.e. other administrative expenses added to 
  other operating expenses divided by total fixed assets); and  
P3   is the value of loaned out funds (i.e., interest overheads divided by  
  the  summation of total deposits and money market funds).  
t   is the period covered by the cost function  
𝛼, 𝛽, 𝛿 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛾   are coefficients to be approximated from 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶𝑡 
𝜀𝑡    is the error term  
From the translog cost function 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐶 𝑡, derivation of the marginal cost was computed as 
follows: 
                                                  𝑀𝐶𝑡 =
𝑇𝐶𝑡
𝑄𝑡
+ [?̂?1 + ?̂?2𝑙𝑛𝑄 + ∑ 𝛾?̂?𝑙𝑛𝑃𝐽
3
𝐽=1
]                                           [6] 
where MCt was obtained and then substituted  to calculate both the Lerner Index and 
Adjusted Lerner Index for the banks at time t, therefore yielding the dynamic change in 
market control across banks over a period. 
 
3.1.2.3. PANZAR-ROSSE H-STATISTIC  
The Panzar-Rosse H-Statistic “P-R” advanced by Panzar and Rosse (1987), was founded on 
a condensed revenue or price model. It is utilised to test the type of competition, if any, 
among the South African Banks.  
Studies in South Africa utilising P-R to approximate the competitive tendencies of a market 
frequently implement a revenue model inclusive of control variables like total assets which 
proxy bank size Simbanegavi et al.(2014), Hope et al.(2013) as many also prefer to 
approximate a price model instead.  
In this study, the revenue form will be utilised in order to focus on the banks’ core 
intermediation functions, which yield interest as their revenue. Robustness checks using 
Total Revenue instead of Interest Revenue will be for comparative purposes. The inclusion 
of bank-specific control variables will curtail distortions of revenue generated from other 
non –core bank activities. The H-Statistic will be derived through a summation of the 
coefficients of the price variables from the revenue model. The guideline for the H-statistic 
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lies on a continuum from below 0 to above 1 i.e. and is construed to imply a Monopoly if 
H<0, Perfect Competition where H>1 and Monopolistic Competition when 0≤H≤1.  The 
revenue equation will be modified following Bikker, Shaffer and Spierdijk, (2012).  
as below; 
 
𝑙(𝐼𝑅) = 𝛼 + (𝛽1𝑃1 + 𝛽2𝑃2 + 𝛽3𝑃3) + (𝑇𝐴𝑆𝑆 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝑇𝐴) + (𝐸𝑇𝐴 ∗ 𝐿𝑂𝐼) + 𝜖𝑡                     [7] 
Where;  
P1   is the rate of labour (i.e. personnel expenses divided by total assets);  
P2   is the value of physical capital (i.e. other administrative expenses added to 
  other operating expenses divided by total fixed assets); and  
P3   is the value of loaned out funds (i.e., interest overheads divided by  
  the summation of total deposits and money market funds).  
t   is the period covered by the cost function  
LOI is income generated from other sources besides interest 
TASS is the banks’ total assets as a proxy for output 
ETA is the bank’s total equity to assets ratio to capture risk  
LOTA  is the banks loanable funds in proportion to the balance sheet. 
 
The H-statistic then follows as below;  
                                                                            𝐻𝑡 = (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3)                                                 [8] 
Where 
 (𝛽1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛽3)   are the coefficients of the input prices  from the P-R revenue model 
   above. 
All variables are log transformed except for ETA. 
 
3.2.  VARIABLES 
All variables under discussion in the study are listed and defined in Table 3.1. 
 
3.2.1. STABILITY 
The fundamental exogenous variable is bank stability which is proxied conventionally 
using the Z-Score index developed by Roy (1952), and utilised by among others, Schaek 
and Cihak (2014), Fu, Lin and Molyneux (2014), Uhde and Heimeshoff (2009), Diallo 
(2015), and Fernandez and Garcia(2015 ), to measure  banks’ risk of failure. The bigger the 
value of the Z-index, infers lesser chances of failure. 
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Table 3.1: Description, classification and definition of variables  
  
 Variable  
Classification 
Variable 
Description 
Variable  
Computation and  Definition  
Dependant 
Variables 
Financial 
stability 
 
Z- score index 
The average ROAs plus Capital Ratios divided by the Standard Deviation of the ROAs.  
It is an inverse estimate of the odds of default a particular bank faces, therefore a larger Z-score 
represents reduced bankruptcy risk. 
 
Independent 
Variables  
Competition 
Measure 
Learner Index 
The difference between the bank’s Total Assets’ Price and Marginal Cost divided by the Total Asset Price.  
The index was promulgated in 1934 by Abba Lerner and measures the bank’s market supremacy on a 
scale between 0 and 1 to reveal the bank’s extent of legroom to charge prices exceeding the marginal cost. 
They take on values between 0 and 1 with 0 denoting perfect competition while superior market power is 
reflected in greater values beyond 0 with 1 signifying a purely monopolistic banking sector. 
Adjusted 
Lerner Index  
The sum of the bank’s profit and total costs but subtracting the marginal cost of a bank’s total assets all 
divided by the sum of the bank’s profits and total costs. As implemented by Diallo (2015). 
Improves on the Lerner by implementing profits instead of revenue to capture the efficiency of cost 
containment, and based on high numerical values indicative of lower competition levels. 
Panzar-Ross H-
Statitistic 
Estimating the revenue function with respect to the price of inputs such as, fixed assets labour and 
borrowing funds while controlling bank-specific variables. 
The inference is as follows; H>1, 0<H<1 and H<0 represent bank environment that are either perfect 
competition, monopolistic competition or pure monopolies respectively. H is extrapolated as the sum of 
the coefficients of the price variables  
Control 
Variable 
Control 
Bank specific Bank-specific control variables will account for  
 liquidity risk via the  liquidity ratio using cash and payables from other banks to total assets  ,   
 credit risk as the credit risk ratio calculated as the loan loss provision to interest income margin and 
 asset composition incorporated as the ratio of  total loans   to total assets 
 
 Macro specific Macro specific variables will account for  
 economy wide shocks  and will range from Growth rate of Gross domestic product,   
 the ease of doing business with and for banks in South Africa  
 the extent of political interference or autonomy in banking   
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3.2.2. COMPETITION 
The Lerner index, Adjusted Lerner index and Panzar-Rosse H-statistic are the 
explanatory variables and also the proxies for bank competition as utilised in similar 
studies such as Fiordelisi and Havranek(2015),  Diallo(2015), Fungáčová, et 
al.(2013)and Schaek and Cihak (2014)and locally, Hope et al. (2013)  and  Simatele 
(2015) respectively. 
3.2.3. CONTROL  
Building on earlier literature and emulating Fiordelisi and Mare (2014) the inclusion of 
two types of control variables shown in Table2 will control for spurious regressions.. 
Table 3.2: List of Macro-specific and Bank-specific sets of control variables   
Bank-specific control variables  
 the logarithm of total asset (size) as  
justification for potential scale economies,  
 equity to asset ratio (ETA) to capture the 
bank’s risk and  
 Interest overhead to total deposits and 
money market funds IOTA 
macro-specific control variables,  
 stock market capitalization (SMC), 
 bank concentration (CON),  
 the economic freedom index (EFI),  
 the financial freedom index (FFI), 
 the real gross domestic product growth rate 
(GDP) and 
 governance (GOV) score 
Adapted from: Fiordelisi and Mare (2014)  
 
3.3. DATA 
Data for the study was collected from numerous sources per Table 3.1 
 
3.3.1. SOURCES  
Initially data for banks was retrieved from McGregor Bureau for Financial Analysis 
(McGregor BFA) in the form of annual bank financial statements, for banks domiciled 
and operating in South Africa in order to capture the bank specific variables reflected in 
Table 3.3.   
According to The Banking Association of South Africa, (2014) there are currently 17 
registered commercial banks in South Africa. Therefore, in light of the period under 
observation, (1990-2015), whose preference is expounded on in Chapter 2, the initial 
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filtration resulted in the available 17 banks being reduced to the big four because the 
period under study was impacted by the availability and consistency of data. 
 Table 3.3: Variable classification and source 
Variable Specifications 
Variable 
Classification 
Variable Description 
/ Proxy 
Source 
Observations  
*Frequency Total      
Financial 
Stability 
Z-Score Index INet Mcgregor BFA Quarterly  
104 
Competition 
Measure 
Lerner Index 
Adjusted Lerner  
P-R H-statistic 
INet Mcgregor BFA  
(individual bank statements )  
through calculationsin E-views from 
Bank specific variables 
Quarterly  
 
 
 
104 
Control 
Bank Specific 
Total Assets  
INet Mcgregor BFA 
 
Quarterly 
 
104 
Equity To Total Assets  
Growth Of Assets  
Bank Deposits To 
Customer Deposits  
Macro Specific 
Stock Market 
Capitalization (SMC), 
World Development Indicators Quarterly 
 
104 
Bank Concentration 
(CON) 
Federal Reserve Economic Data Quarterly 
 
104 
Economic Freedom 
Index (EFI) 
www.heritage.org / Fraser institute Quarterly 
 
104 
Financial Freedom 
Index (FFI) 
www.heritage.org / 
Fraser institute 
Quarterly 
 
104 
Governance (GOV) 
Score 
world bank Quarterly 
 
104 
GrossDomestic 
Product Growth Rate 
(GDP) 
Fraser institute Quarterly 
 
104 
*Data was obtained as annual and converted to quarterly through frequency conversion from1990-2015  
Secondly macro-economic country level data was collected from a myriad of sources 
including the World Bank, Heritage Foundation, Freedom house and SARB and Quantec 
Easy Data as illustrated in Table 3.3. 
3.3.2. SAMPLE  
The study  concentrated on the big four banks owing to elimination of other banks from 
the sample due to representativeness of data, precisely more so for banks not yet 
operational in the period 1990-2015, i.e. those with missing bank specific variables such 
as total revenue. Thirdly, the size of the market brought the sample down from 17 banks 
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to the largest 4 banks owing to the sheer market size garnered by the top 4 which 
accounts for over 90% of the total South African Bank Market as reflected in figure 2.  
 
Figure 2: South African Bank Market Share 2015  
Source : Calculated from Mcgregor BFA 
 
From Figure 2, by the end of 2015, Standard bank held the leading market share 
position at 28% with FNB and Nedbank both garnering 21% then followed by ABSA on 
19%.  These holdings have remained relatively stable since 2013. Investec trails the big 
four at 9% while Capitec and African Bank held on 1,5% each. The rest of the market 
accounted for less than 0% market share. 
 
In this environment, the high level of market power wielded would incline the industry 
to be driven by these major players. These banks are Amalgamated Banks of South 
Africa, Firstrand National Bank, Standard Bank of South Africa and Nedbank Ltd 
hereinafter ABSA, FNB  Standard and Nedbank respectively. 
3.3.3. FREQUENCY  
All bank-specific and macro-economic country level data were extracted as annual data 
over the 1990-2015 period and then extrapolated into quarterly frequency by means of 
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the Quadratic- Match Average frequency conversion method using E-Views software. 
The number of observations for the banks and the variables were collected as presented 
in Table 3.1. 
3.3.4. PERIOD UNDER REVIEW 
Initially the period covers numerous pre and post crises affecting South African banks.  
The period under study is preferred as it is a longer period than other studies because; 
 It adequately captures both the pre and post economic shocks  and reactionary 
recalibration of fiscal and monetary policies to reinstate system stability owing to 
post-crises system instabilities which manifested in the South African financial 
system caused by the Global Financial Crisis as well as African Bank’s collapse and 
subsequent rescue package over 1990-2015 
 Previous studies in South Africa have only covered the period up until 2011 yet after 
2011, a number of financial stability reforms have been adopted in an effort to 
curtail instability in the banking system following contagion experienced as a result 
of global financial calamities that occurred. 
Up until March 2017, three commissions of enquiry into competitive behaviour among 
banks have been set up and while two had not yielded any negative findings, more 
recently exchange rate rigging and tampering by the big four in collusion with foreign 
banks has been reported by Bloomberg (2017) and Mail &Guardian, (2017). There 
continues to be a keen interest in the perceived collusive activities of the big four 
especially because they command a large market share (see Figure 3) 
In Figure 3, the combined market share of the big 4 banks surpasses the rest of the market 
consistently in excess of 90% from 2013 to 2015. 
3.1. ESTIMATION  
Estimations with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for the Lerner index as well 
as the Adjusted Lerner and the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic were utilised. The study’s 
robust standard error corrections of the HAC Newey West format were centred at bank 
level. These adjusted for correlation, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity between 
banks variables. 
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Figure 3: Big four bank’s market share 2013-2015   Source : Calculated from Mcgregor BFA 
 
Building on earlier literature and emulating Fiordelisi, and Mare (2014) the inclusion of 
two types of control variables shown in table, (a macro-specific and bank-specific sets of 
control variables), will reduce the problem of spurious regressions. Bank-specific 
control variables will control spurious regressions by accounting for liquidity risk, 
credit risk, and asset composition while macro-specific controls will account for 
economic factors that affect the banking sector. Summary  
The empirical test of competition indices were estimated  using the Learner; Efficiency 
Adjusted Lerner as well as Panzar-Rosse models while the Z-score proxied financial 
stability.  Estimation using Ordinary Least Squares methods with robust standard 
errors were utilised in a two- pronged estimation approach with a log-transformation 
method to calculate the Lerner, Adjusted Lerner indices and H-statistic. 
 
The overall model portrays a generally good fit with an R2 above 70%. 
In the entire dataset and for all model calculations, the incidence of heteroscedasticity 
was controlled for via a two-step method. Initially the series went through differential 
log transformation and where it was found to be still prevalent was then subjected to 
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the inbuilt HAC Newy -West method of covariance in OLS, from the results of the 
Breush-Pagan/Godfrey/Cook–Weisberg statistic of the residual’s variance. 
3.4. SUMMARY   
Chapter 3 has provided an in-depth description of the precise empirical models use to 
test he competition- stability nexus, defined the individual variables and explained the 
sampling methods. 
 Additionally, the chapter has presented control variables that will reduce the 
prevalence of spurious regressions in estimating the individual models. The subsequent 
chapter articulates the results from the tests and presents findings.    
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
4.1. OVERALL RESULTS  
The Efficiency Adjusted Lerner in [4] (Kotter et al., 2012) necessitated by the 
inaccuracies of Lerner from [3] utilises profits instead of prices and results in an 
average index of 0.617  when the model is subjected to more stringent inputs against 
the estimated Lerner  index of 0.713. Both outcomes imply a banking sector that is 
monopolistically competitive.  
Table 4.1: Comparison of competition indices over 1990-2015 
 Source: Author’s  regression output with inputs from variable inputs in Table 3.3 
 
4.2. DIAGNOSTICS 
In the dataset, a number of diagnostic tests were carried out and corrected for as 
illustrated in the Appendices A to H. Additionally the variables were subjected to log 
differencing in order to control heteroscedasticity. 
4.2.1. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Initially, all variables in the study are from time series data, which has a random walk 
tendency that needs to be controlled so that the mean of the data centres on zero.  This 
was done using differenced log transformations and then the output was tested for 
stationarity utilising the unit root test i.e. Augmented Dicky- Fuller. These test results 
were further reinforced by the stationarity tests of  Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and 
Shin “KPSS” and thus validating their compliance with OLS variable inclusion criteria. 
The results are presented in Appendix A; table A1. The decision criteria is based on the 
Year 1990 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Lerner index 0.922 -0.1470      0.9728      1.1062        0.5261        0.8888         0.6473       0.1929     1.0828    0.8907      0.8244      
Adjusted Lerner index 0.682 0.6856        1.0050      0.6533        0.6750        0.6685         0.6398       0.5459     0.5262    0.5174      0.5173      
Year 2003 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
Lerner index 0.7702         0.6441        0.5796      0.6169        1.1199        0.6056         0.3985       0.7598     0.6058    0.8139      0.5850      0.7131    
Adjusted Lerner index 0.5259         0.5473        0.4608      0.4871        0.5280        0.5885         0.6707       0.7405     0.7798    0.7822      0.6168      0.6170    
Comparison of Competition Indicies  1990-2015
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T-Statistic’s probability value not exceeding the 10% level. The marginal cost (MC_2), 
appendix C, a derivative function of LTC was calculated with inputs from the LTC 
function with only the raw proportion of total costs and the balance sheet to get (TCQ).   
Overall, unit stationarity of MC_2 was achieved without log transformation (Appendix A; 
Table A1.) While minimally positively skewed, the overall normality (Appendix C; 
Figure C2) of the function is centred on zero with an excess Kurtosis of 16,98070.  
A visual inspection of the histogram in Appendix B fig  shows a normally distributed 
LTC series once it has undergone differential log transformation however the excess 
kurtosis and JB statistics attest otherwise. This can be attributed to the individually 
skewed variables as well as the outliers present in the data because values were not 
adjusted for inflation over the period 1990-2015. 
From the Log transformed Total Cost (LTC), then the Marginal cost (MC) in equation [6], 
was calculated and found to be stationary at level in Appendix C. 
The Z-score [2] using the learner [3] produced diagnostics in appendix E  and was 
estimated  using with bank variable inputs (Q) as well as the MC_2 previously 
calculated. After log transformation, it was found to be stationary except for total assets 
TASS while the residuals were normally distributed but with some outliers and an 
excess kurtosis of 10.28027. High correlation was noted between LOTA and its square 
which is explained by Figure E3’s pattern of both measures in the linear and quadratic 
form following a distinctly similar pattern but are necessary in the model for an 
inference of the increased level of the price of borrowed funds. 
By inspection of the correlelogram (LTC) in Appendix C, as well as the values of the Q-
Statistic across 36 lags. However, the normality JB statistic indicated positively skewed 
data series. 
4.2.2. CORRELATIONS  
Following on, the presence of multicollinearity was tested for, and addressed by looking 
at the overall impact of the individual significance of the independent variables on the 
overall model. In the case of the LTC model in equation [5], variables dealing with P3, 
were found to be statistically insignificant (refer to correlation matrix in Appendix B; 
TableB1).  However compared to the other 9 variables overall, , these were not 
29 
 
eliminated as they serve the core of the LTC theory and only affected 3 out of 12, (25%) 
,inputs into the LTC model rendering a minimal part of the coefficients of LTC as 
unreliable.  
A correlation of 67%,( appendix C; table C3), was noted between the LTC coefficient 
inputs product with the price variables and the output function MC_2 which is to be 
expected as these are the variable costs of the total cost function.  
The correlelogram in Appendix C: Figure C4 depicts no serial correlation as all estimates 
fall within the zero line both above and below. 
Serial correlation was tested for on LTC’s residuals in Table B4using the Breusch-
Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test and both F and Chi-squared statistics attest to the 
absence of serial correlation as the p-values are greater than 0.05.  
4.2.3. REGRESSION STATISTICS 
From Appendix B; Table B3, the R2 value at 83% for LTC reflects a well fitted model as 
only 17% of variability in LTC is attributable to the residuals or other independent 
variables not accounted for herein 
LTC’s Z-Score of 76% of is explained by the Lerner index and control variables included 
as shown in table 4. The variables jointly influence the overall model well with an F-test 
of 29.27 at p<1%, hence they are highly jointly significant in establishing financial 
stability. Serial correlation is relatively well accounted for at p<5% however, 
heteroscedasticity remains prevalent at p<5% but because it has been controlled for 
with robust standard error corrections, the standard errors were rendered reliable. The 
model’s residuals are highly skewed and do not follow a normal distribution with the Q- 
Stat stabilising at lag4; suggesting that the financial stability and competition index may 
not follow a linear pattern. 
The Z-score is robust to use of the  Adjusted Lerner as it’s fit is 75.5%  with variables 
jointly influencing the overall model at p=0.000 and F-test at 28,909956. Serial 
correlation has a 0.5732 probability of elimination and is thus well controlled with chi-
squared of 0.939070. Heteroscedasticity remains prevalent though corrected for. 
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The P-R (lir) model reveals that 80% of price as well as bank and macro-economic 
variables explain changes in interest income.  The level of competition at 0.6625 is 
calculated from the price coefficients which are highly significant individually and as 
well jointly with F-statistic at 78, 33. Serial correlation is controlled for at p=0.4263. The 
introduction of total revenue reveals that the P-R (ltr) model is robust to alternative 
forms of banks income  as shown by the drastic reduction of the H-statistic to 0,24904 
in addition to which the model’s overall fit with regressors falls to 66% . Furthermore 
substantiating the robustness is the joint significance of variables influence on the 
model falling to 36.85521 while serial correlation is well controlled at p=0.8510. 
4.2.3.1. PANZAR- ROSSE H-STATISTIC 
 
The Panzar- Rosse H-statistic is estimated at 0.66205 for South African banks between 
the period 1990-2015 as illustrated below, in table 5.   
With the H-statistic estimated at 0.66205 in the study then monopolistic competition is 
inferred to have been the prevailing market condition for South African banks between 
the period 1990-2015 as illustrated in table 5.  
The Big 4 banks wield a higher degree of market power with respect to competition in 
the banking sector.  
 
The P-R H-Statistic’s outcome is robust to interest income as well as total revenue as 
evidenced by the big variation between the 0.66205 and 0.24904. However, the Total 
revenue model reveals a weak form of monopolistic competition as it tends to 0 which is 
indicative of perfect competition. 
 
This speaks to the income generating sources that banks are at liberty to benefit from 
other than the traditional core intermediation; hence, as more sources of income avail 
themselves to banks the big four will wield the less market power. It is also a testament 
to the current inroads made by Capitec Bank as a player of note in the last 2 years (see 
figure1) with a market share of 9%.    
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Table 4.21: Regression on Panzar- Rosse’ H-statistic results 
 
 
Results from both models also reveal that the main catalyst of the H-statistic is the cost 
of obtaining funds, while the price of labour and capital expenditure both  impact the H-
Statistic  minimally though labour is affected in a negative manner . 
 
The control variables show that there is a negative relationship between interest 
income and the ratio of other income generating sources and capital assets suggesting 
that banks in South Africa should increase their equity investment and on non-core 
intermediation income generating activities although they tend to be riskier thus 
reducing the level of monopolistic competition in the banking sector. By inference this 
increases instability via the Z-score index as calculated thus inclining the sector towards 
the competition-fragility  viewpoint that as the risk preferences of  banks increase, so 
too is the burden of risk passed  on from the bank shareholders to other external 
creditors.  This implies that an increase in competition among banks will increase 
financial stability. This study has yielded results analogous with other studies in South 
Africa, Simatele (2015), Simbanegavi et al., (2014), Mlambo and Ncube (2011), and 
Variable 
Estimate                                                S.E Estimate                                                S.E
0.024348* 0.297171
(0.014193) (0.179810)
-0.496001*** -0.759546***
(0.188427) (0.165585)
1.133703*** 0.711415***
(0.195166) (0.078724)
-4.099998 -1.748299*
(1.347677) (0.900719)
-0.092066* -0.046141*
(0.026692) (0.020266)
9.783515* 5.304624*
(1.712852) (1.305986)
Obs
R-squared
First stage F -test (joint ) 78.33649 p=0.0000 36.85521 p=0.0000
     Serial correlation 1.049272 P=0.4263 0.723522 P=0.8510
    heteroskedasticity 55.66784 P=0,0000 18.67425 P=0,0000
H-Statistic 0.66205 0.24904
Constant 
102
80%
P_1(-1)
P_2
P_3
ETA*LOI
LTASS*LOTA
103
66%
Results Panzar -Rosse 1990-2015
* 10% significance
*** 1%significance
** 5%significance
Regression on Interest Income(lir) Regression on Interest Income(ltr)
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Hope et al., (2013) with respect to the case of monopolistic competition for South 
African banks. 
 
4.2.3.2. LERNER INDEX AND  ADJUSTED LERNER INDEX 
 
Both indices are well fitted models at 80% and 60% respectively.  The competition 
indices reflect a positive relationship with financial stability with the adjusted Lerner 
reflecting a weakly positive influence on stability. This is because profits and not total 
revenues are used in the estimation and thus reduces the bias created by cost structures 
that could take up the lion’s share of the income. Profits are a better measure of revenue 
as they are attributable to shareholders. This difference in competition index 
coefficients can be assigned to high operating expenses for the banks.  
 
Capital expenditure; LNFATA reacts negatively to stability implying that when banks 
invest more than warranted in fixed assets this may increase instability as this creates 
illiquidity and depositors may struggle to withdraw funds under the banks’ custody , the 
so- called cash shortages.   
 
Control variables have opposite effects both as bank and macro-specific. variables. The 
extent of financial freedom LFFI speaks to the ease of doing business with banks  in 
South Africa and as well in addition to how easily funds can be accessed. The more 
stringent the less stable the environment will be as depositors will prefer to withhold 
their liquid cash and rather externalise it or use it in a parallel market.  Macro variables 
like GDP Growth (LGDPG)and Stock Market’s Capitalisation (LSMC) inverse relationship 
with stability infer intermediation efficiency as well as economic health because low 
growth reflects instability and thus the channels of intermediation maybe interfered 
with or even not functioning efficiently. 
 
The magnitude of the coefficients (-0.000603 and -0.000694) here is minimal 
evidencing the extent and impact of economy triggers as being almost insignificant in 
the short term but worthwhile to be noted as the effects are felt in the long-run.  
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Overall the results speak to the competition-fragility view , wherein some of the control 
variables at play in our model will boost financial stability and others will be indicators 
of the extent of stability of a financial system.  
 
Table 4.2.2: Regression of Z-Score on Lerner Index & Adjusted Lerner Index 
 
      
They postulate that some macro-economic control variables enhance financial sector 
stability and furthermore calling for continent-wide bank alliances as these may 
enhance the success rate of Small and Medium Enterprises by facilitating access to 
financial products and services.   
4.3. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS  
The Efficiency Adjusted Lerner in [4] (Kotter et al., 2012) a hybrid of the  Lerner from 
[3] utilises profits instead of prices and results in both outcomes which imply a banking 
sector that is monopolistically competitive. 
 
Variable 
Estimate                                                S.E Estimate                                                S.E
1.158633* 0.012062
(0.735110) (0.009283)
-0.20353*** -0.200418
(0.055560) 0.058322
-1.21E-10 -1.59E-10
(1.18E-10) 1.14E-10
0.374841*** 0.386286
(0.091970) 0.098982
0.009364*** 0.008989
(0.002053) 0.002058
0.171667 0.173251
(0.039213) 0.040192
-0.000603*** -0.000694
(0.000149) 0.000159
0.11632** 0.109721
(0.056667) 0.056521
-0.159231** -0.154685
(0.073536) 0.075487
0.005013 0.005691
(0.003885) 0.004025
-0.123420 0.789445
(0.629727) 0.347989
Obs
R-squared
First stage F -test (joint ) 29.27565 p=0.0000 28.09956 p=0.0000
     Serial correlation 1.681941 P=0.0402 0.939070 P=0.5732
    heteroskedasticity 22.8176 P=0,0114 3.434643 P=0,0018
JB Statistic 594.2452 p=0.0000 477.4639 p=0.0000
Qstat lag 4 p=0.0000 30.932 p=0.0000
Results of Stability Regression(Z-Score_Index) 1990-2015
Regression on Lerner Index Regression on AdjustedLerner Index
LGOV
LERNER
LNFATA
TASS
LOTA
LOTA^2
LGDPG*LSMC
LETA
LFFI
LHHI
Constant
102 102
76% 75.5%
* 10% significance
** 5%significance
*** 1%significance
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The data is generally normally distributed with minimal skewness attributed to outliers 
as a result of using data that is not adjusted for inflation.  
The results are generally acceptable  as no serial correlation is detectable at 5% level. 
However, the model’s highly skewed residuals are suggesting that the financial stability 
and competition index may not follow a linear pattern. 
The P-R H-Statistic’s robustness to interest income as well as total revenue is indicative 
of perfect competition and supports the notion of the income generating sources that 
banks are at liberty to benefit from other than the traditional core intermediation; 
hence, as more sources of income avail themselves to banks the big four will wield the 
less market power. It is also a testament to the current inroads made by Capitec Bank at 
9%. The main catalyst of the H-statistic is the cost of obtaining funds, while the prices of 
labour and capital expenditure have minimal impact.  
According to Crockett (1997) stability through public policy has been necessitated by 
numerous advances globally which include among others the voluminous surge in 
financial transactions, the use of hybrid complex financial instruments ,the contagion 
incurred as a result of costly calamities in the  financial systems from numerous 
prominently distinct institutions. Banks in South Africa should increase their equity 
investment and non-core intermediation income generating activities as there is a 
negative relationship between interest income and the ratio of other income generating 
sources. This however implies that banks will engage in more risk y behaviour and by 
inference this increases instability as the burden of risk passed on from the bank 
shareholders to other external creditors.  This implies that an increase in competition 
among banks will impact financial stability. Henceforth the competition-stability nexus 
research findings have connotations for policy formulators, professional practioners 
and the agencies of regulation and supervision. 
4.4.  SUMMARY  
 
The three models exhibit results that imply a banking sector that is monopolistically 
competitive. The models were controlled for serial correlation and heteroscedacity and 
as well for spurious regressions by using control variables. The robustness of bank 
values to non-interest income explains bank’s tendency to engage in risky behaviour for 
35 
 
which they do not undertake ficuciary responsibility as they pass on the risks to other 
stakeholders thus impacting financial stability negatively. The study finds that in a 
monopolistically competitive environment, policy formulators, professional 
practitioners and agencies of regulation and supervision can harness the positive side 
effects to maintain financial stability.  
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Chapter 5  
Summary, Recommendations & Conclusion 
5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
While mapping the competitive terrain of the South African banking market and 
inferring the effect of competition on stability, for the big four banks over the duration  
1990-2015, the study has found a case for monopolistic competition under a state of 
competition- fragility.  
 These findings are aligned with preceding studies of a similar nature. This study has 
juxtaposed the competition and stability discourse by describing the competitive 
environment for South African Banks, estimated competition indices, positioned South 
Africa’s predisposition in the theory of banking competition and posited a competition-
stability relationship. Competition indices were estimated   using the Learner; efficiency 
Adjusted Lerner as well as Panzar-Rosse models while the Z-score proxied financial 
stability. Ordinary Least Squares methods with robust standard errors were utilised. 
 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The outcomes have connotations for policy formulation, suggesting that  while South 
African Banks are monopolistically competitive, there is room to harness the spill overs 
from macro-economic indicators of financial health and stability for instance through 
improved access to finance and bank alliances that will enhance the prospects of Small 
and Medium Enterprises.   
In addition, the South African Government through its agency of regulation and 
supervision would be better placed to maintain financial stability armed with the 
mechanism for setting reforms in a monopolistic competition environment.  
Merits for the professional practitioners and regulators lie in the utilisation of the 
models as yardsticks for potential investors in banks as well as for predicting equity 
prices.   
 
5.3 LIMITATIONS OF STUDY  
The models assume uniformity of costs and sources of income across the banks. 
The values are not adjusted for inflation hence the comparison will biased as financial 
statement figure have ballooned across the 26-year period covered by the study. 
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Although heteroscedasticity was controlled for using robust standard errors available 
such as Differential Logs and HAC Newey West covariance methods, it remained 
detectable at 1% level. 
High chances of Endogeneity of data from banks used for both calculations of the 
competition index as well as control variables inputs.  
5.4 FULFILMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
In light of the context of this research, this study has fulfilled the objectives by covering 
the period 1990-2015 during which a number of crises occurred and impacted the 
stability of banks. The study also empirically investigated the   effect of competition 
among the big four banks and found an inverse impact on financial stability. It as well is 
corroborating the findings on the South African banks’ predisposition when it comes to 
the competitive landscape of monopolistic competition and has debunked the 
concentration – competition misnomer. 
The study has gone on to suggesting policy formulations for the agents of regulation and 
supervision that uphold the monetary policy transmission mechanism in light of the 
monopolistic competitive environment. 
5.5 CONCLUSION  
Henceforth all research questions have been answered because the research 
complements existing literature by inferring the effect of competition on stability, over 
the duration 1990-2015 and debunking the concentration-competition misnomer. It 
also maps the competitive terrain of the South African banking market by utilising a 
two- pronged estimation approach. Initially competition is estimated using a log-
transformation method to calculate the Lerner, Adjusted Lerner indices and H-statistic. 
Followed by, calculation of the Z-Score. The study then uses the results from the three 
indices to exhaustively affirm monopolistic competition as the predominant competitive 
environment in South Africa. Using the Z-score and Lerner indices with OLS estimation 
methods incorporating robust standard errors, the study posits the relationship 
between competition and stability and suggests that South Africa is inclined towards 
competition-fragility. These finding are aligned with preceding studies of a similar 
nature and have implications for policy formulation. 
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The outcomes have connotations for policy formulation, suggesting that  while South 
African Banks are monopolistically competitive, there is room to harness the spill overs 
from macro-economic indicators of financial health and stability for instance through 
improved access to finance and bank alliances that will enhance the prospects of Small 
and Medium Enterprises.  In addition, the South African Government through its agency 
of regulation and supervision would be better placed to conserve financial stability 
armed with the mechanism for setting reforms in a monopolistic competition 
environment. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: UNIT ROOT TESTS. 
Table A1 
Decision to include variables based on fulfilment of unit root tests and stationarity tests using 
Augmented  Dicky Fuller (ADF) and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS). 
Decision Criteria ADF: tadf>tcrit & KPSS: tkpss<tcrit     ***significant @1%, 5% and 10%   ,** 
significant at 5% and 10%, *significant at 10% 
Zscore  unit root -10.15361613277694 at 1st difference 
  
Variables Diagnostic Tests 
Macro- 
Specific 
Variables  
1ST Difference 2ND Difference 
tests 
ADF (unit root) KPSS (stationarity) ADF (unit root)  KPSS (stationarity) 
EFI -2.871379066623951* 0.2268326585793738*** -6.94489386313608*** 0.02821405073090554*** 
FFI -3.338051775892384** 0.03147437784267129*** -6.84224758475201*** 0.02279033340792126*** 
GDPG -3.370189850064194** 0.05920968733324861*** -5.57159757748150*** 0.03671185422882583*** 
GOV -4.208370575515412*** 0.2813296644970669***   
     
SMC -3.196619007702629** 0.05118028145325941*** -6.93879419802778*** 0.03720654922374221*** 
Bank-Specific 
Variables tests 
TC   -4.75210063857562*** 0.02568267866433377*** 
Q   -10.1182040019704*** 0.075672587008453*** 
P1 -2.8789988823908* 0.1472809842228747*** -7.63209385918325*** 0.04083653282345643*** 
P2 -3.608207520020718*** 0.145237721610811***   
P3  -3.665119623583387 *** 0.0948614502408493***   
PAT   -6.06888357670390*** 0.02833546298086162*** 
TASS   -10.1182040019704*** 0.075672587008453*** 
P(trev/tass) -3.348787393568402** 0.06592459815820255*** -11.5794015581256*** 0.02911571521726422*** 
IR -3.090557117568479** 0.4056422503096507** -17.2388238149370*** 0.0796748887915719*** 
TEQA   -10.3597160937510*** 0.05307508181194911*** 
HHI                 
(concentration) 
-3.405950704017879** 0.0254953212108074*** -4.94844376515045*** 0.02392840162555107*** 
LTREV -3.889043986584545*** 0.06309554824260841***   
LTLTASS -3.459202366607736** 0.1946680045396793***   
     
46 
 
Appendix B: Log Total Cost (LTC) 
Table B1: Correlation Matrix LTC   
 
        
Figure B1: LTC individual stationarity 
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c7*DLP1*
DLP2
c8*DLP1*
DDLP3
c9*DLP2*
DDLP3
c10*LQ*
DLP1
c11*LQ*
DLP2
c12*LQ*
DDLP3
C2*LQ 100% -64% -19% 13% 21% -16% -1% 14% -12% 5% -21%
c3*LQ^2 -64% 100% 10% -7% -19% 1% 6% -14% -14% -17% 32%
c4*DLP1 -19% 10% 100% -9% 9% 17% 49% -4% -86% -5% -4%
c5*DLP2 13% -7% -9% 100% -14% -1% 0% -39% 4% 90% 17%
C6*DDLP3 21% -19% 9% -14% 100% -1% 9% 22% -9% -16% -88%
c7*DLP1*DLP2 -16% 1% 17% -1% -1% 100% 67% 5% 8% 8% 4%
c8*DLP1*DDLP3 -1% 6% 49% 0% 9% 67% 100% 4% -42% 0% -3%
c9*DLP2*DDLP3 14% -14% -4% -39% 22% 5% 4% 100% 2% -57% -40%
c10*LQ*DLP1 -12% -14% -86% 4% -9% 8% -42% 2% 100% 9% 3%
c11*LQ*DLP2 5% -17% -5% 90% -16% 8% 0% -57% 9% 100% 24%
c12*LQ*DDLP3 -21% 32% -4% 17% -88% 4% -3% -40% 3% 24% 100%
Correlation Matrix: LTC (log Total Cost)
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Table B2: Distribution stats LTC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LTC C(1) C2*LQ C3*LQ^2 C4*DLP2 C5*DDLP3 C6*DLP1*DLP2 C7*DLP1*DDLP3 C8*DLP2*DDLP3 C9*LQ*DLP1 C10*LQ*DLP2 C11*LQ*DDLP3
 Mean 5.648732 1 16.51064 24.81334 -0.833209 -3.68172 -4.457722 -184.5917 -8.27347 13.665 -255.7497 9.377831
 Median 3.69533 1 16.6531 16.65533 -1.004113 -10.58134 -0.052884 -1.545357 0.179588 0.254772 -106.188 1.509809
 Maximum 109.6433 1 54.10965 172.6527 165.0959 954.0753 23.75071 4621.623 144.6696 759.6462 14589.78 450.7951
 Minimum -106.0773 1 -41.5356 9.77E-05 -107.725 -940.0832 -125.7443 -14035.81 -333.6391 -321.6003 -10920.48 -279.6412
 Std. Dev. 25.8561 0 12.23384 29.97415 27.5224 214.6555 21.47645 1638.286 56.07877 116.8176 2930.201 75.80427
 Skewness -0.078709  NA -0.539625 2.838448 1.542407 0.243459 -3.67874 -6.271173 -3.190166 2.68758 1.435193 1.930085
 Kurtosis 8.761075  NA 8.218945 12.02791 17.46027 10.40973 17.82362 53.94242 18.09053 20.70587 14.91366 17.45984
 Jarque-Bera 139.7788  NA 119.5258 478.6147 920.0065 232.0524 1152.546 11583.19 1129.654 1440.892 631.9837 942.6154
 Probability 0  NA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 Sum 570.5219 101 1667.574 2506.147 -84.15412 -371.8537 -450.2299 -18643.77 -835.6205 1380.165 -25830.72 947.1609
 Sum Sq. Dev. 66853.82 0 14966.69 89844.97 75748.28 4607698 46123.77 2.68E+08 314482.8 1364635 8.59E+08 574628.8
 Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101
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Figure B2: LTC Individual Variables Normality test 
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Appendix C: Marginal Cost 
Figure C1 
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Figure C2 
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Table C1: MC_2 distribution statistics 
 
 MC_2 TCQ A1 A2 QP 
 Mean  0.008982  0.011920  0.067112  0.755808 -0.042779 
 Median  0.007002  0.010129  0.067112  0.764818 -0.085501 
 Maximum  0.088621  0.024029  0.067112  2.473707  8.394018 
 Minimum -0.021484  0.001192  0.067112 -1.898865 -5.439449 
 Std. Dev.  0.012400  0.007199  0.000000  0.556605  1.394427 
 Skewness  2.764020  0.212090  NA -0.547371  1.564549 
 Kurtosis  18.98070  1.633652  NA  8.298810  17.49894 
      
 Jarque-Bera  1215.254  8.699054  NA  124.4223  935.0443 
 Probability  0.000000  0.012913  NA  0.000000  0.000000 
      
 Sum  0.916180  1.215831  6.845424  77.09244 -4.363484 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  0.015529  0.005234  0.000000  31.29072  196.3870 
      
 Observations  102  102  102  102  102 
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Figure C3: MC_2 stationarity 
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Table C2: MC_2 correlation. 
 
 
 
MC_2 TCQ A2 QP
MC_2 100% 26% 29% 67%
TCQ 26% 100% -43% 14%
A2 29% -43% 100% -12%
QP 67% 14% -12% 100%
Correlation Matrix: Marginal Cost 
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Figure C4: MC_2 Corelelogram 
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Appendix D: Zscore 
Lerner stationarity 
Figure D1 
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Appendix E: Lerner Index 
Zscore – Lerner variable Stationarity 
Figure E1 
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Table E1 
 
     
Figure E2 
LZSCORELERNER LNFATA TASS LOTA LOTA^2 LETA
LGDPG*L
SMC LGOV LFFI LHHI
LZSCORE 100% 17% -36% -4% 38% 3% 51% -18% 3% -17% -12%
LERNER 17% 100% -7% -3% 41% -38% -6% -32% -15% -12% -12%
LNFATA -36% -7% 100% -10% -48% 44% 14% -18% 11% 18% -8%
TASS -4% -3% -10% 100% 13% -14% -2% -12% -23% -9% -1%
LOTA 38% 41% -48% 13% 100% -78% -14% -17% -14% -33% -10%
LOTA^2 3% -38% 44% -14% -78% 100% 37% 5% 1% 46% -3%
LETA 51% -6% 14% -2% -14% 37% 100% 0% 3% 11% -7%
LGDPG*LSMC -18% -32% -18% -12% -17% 5% 0% 100% 24% 6% 51%
LGOV 3% -15% 11% -23% -14% 1% 3% 24% 100% 9% 18%
LFFI -17% -12% 18% -9% -33% 46% 11% 6% 9% 100% 0%
LHHI -12% -12% -8% -1% -10% -3% -7% 51% 18% 0% 100%
Correlation Matrix: Lerner INDEX
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Figure E3 
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Appendix F: Adjusted Lerner 
Figure 1F 
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LZSCORE 1 0.0086 -0.3596 -0.0385 0.378581 0.0284 0.51081 -0.18455 0.0306 -0.1662 -0.1202
DADJLEN(-1) 1% 100% 9% -1% -1% -2% 9% 1% 4% 4% 1%
LNFATA -36% 9% 100% -10% -48% 44% 14% -18% 11% 18% -8%
TASS -4% -1% -10% 100% 13% -14% -2% -12% -23% -9% -1%
LOTA 38% -1% -48% 13% 100% -78% -14% -17% -14% -33% -10%
LOTA^2 3% -2% 44% -14% -78% 100% 37% 5% 1% 46% -3%
LETA 51% 9% 14% -2% -14% 37% 100% 0% 3% 11% -7%
LGDPG*LSMC -18% 1% -18% -12% -17% 5% 0% 100% 24% 6% 51%
LGOV 3% 4% 11% -23% -14% 1% 3% 24% 100% 9% 18%
LFFI -17% 4% 18% -9% -33% 46% 11% 6% 9% 100% 0%
LHHI -12% 1% -8% -1% -10% -3% -7% 51% 18% 0% 100%
Correlation Matrix: Ajusted  Lerner INDEX
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Appendix G : Panzar- Rosse H- statistic using IR 
Table 1G
 
Figure 1G 
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LIR P_1(-1) P_2 P_3
ETA*LO
I
LTASS*
LOTA
LIR 100% 2% 50% 79% -9% -40%
P_1(-1) 2% 100% 0% 0% 5% -1%
P_2 50% 0% 100% 85% 8% 12%
P_3 79% 0% 85% 100% 10% -8%
ETA*LOI -9% 5% 8% 10% 100% 11%
LTASS*LOTA -40% -1% 12% -8% 11% 100%
Correlation Matrix: Panzar -Rosse H-Statistic
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Panzar- Rosse H- statistic using IR STATIONARITY 
Figure 2G 
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Appendix H : Appendix G Panzar- Rosse H- statistic using TR 
Table .1H 
 
  
LTR P_1(-1) P_2 P_3 LETA*LOI
LOTA*LT
ASS
LTR 100% 1% 71% 88% 45% -14%
P_1(-1) 1% 100% 0% 0% 0% -1%
P_2 71% 0% 100% 85% 16% 12%
P_3 88% 0% 85% 100% 49% -8%
LETA*LOI 45% 0% 16% 49% 100% -10%
LOTA*LTASS -14% -1% 12% -8% -10% 100%
Correlation Matrix: Panzar -Rosse H-Statistic
